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ECONOMICS  
 
 
In 2013, Russia’s outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) soared and the 
OFDI stock exceeded $ 500 billion. 
However, a year later, Russia’s OFDI 
dropped by nearly 15 per cent. Rapid 
upward and downward swings make it 
necessary to analyze the motivation of 
Russian firms to invest abroad as well as to 
assess the impact of sanctions on Russian 
OFDI.  
The author points out that a significant 
part of Russia’s outward FDI stock is 
accounted for by the operations of Russian 
corporations in their home market. It is 
concluded that although Western sanctions 
target a relatively small number of Russian 
citizens and companies, they nevertheless 
affect some of Russia’s key people, largest 
banks, and hydrocarbon producers. 
Therefore, their direct impact could be 
substantial. Alongside the direct impact, one 
should consider their indirect impact, such 
as the tumbling rouble exchange rate and 
Russian banks’ increasing interest rates, 
which decrease Russian firms’ capability to 
invest abroad. Moreover, a less amicable 
political atmosphere in the West may push 
some Russian corporations out of the 
Western markets and diminish the 
enthusiasm of new ones to enter them. 
Today, Russia’s counter-sanctions do not 
directly restrict the country’s OFDI, but 
Russian state-owned enterprises may reach 
a decision to hold foreign investments to 
support Russia’s sanction policy. 
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1. Russia’s transformation into the world’s 6th largest OFDI  
country in 2014 1 
 
Completion of privatization in the major sectors of Russian economy and 
industrial restructuring in the 1990s became the prerequisites that enabled 
Russian corporate expansion abroad. The improved financial state of Rus-
sian companies and the accumulation of wealth2 were two other precondi-
tions for their internationalization.  
The beginning of Russia’s outward investment boom coincided with sky-
rocketing oil prices. In January 1999, the price of oil was slightly more than 
USD10 per barrel, whereas by June 2008 it had already exceeded USD130 
[14]. Simultaneously, Russia’s oil production jumped from 6.2 million to 
nearly 10.8 million barrels a day [3; 4]. The oil boom and the spillover effect 
it had on the Russian economy enabled Russian oil companies to invest 
abroad. Moreover, several corporations in other natural resource-based in-
dustries witnessed the same phenomenon due to the rising prices of raw ma-
terials [51].   
Before the second half of the 1990s, a Russian firm abroad was a rarity 
and capital flight dominated capital exports from Russia. In the mid-1990s, 
Russia was of little global consequence in terms of its OFDI3. In 1995, Rus-
sia’s OFDI stock totaled a mere USD three billion. From 1995 to 2013, Rus-
sia’s OFDI stock was steadily growing only to drop by almost 15 % in 2014. 
By the end of 2014, Russia’s accumulated OFDI was over USD400 billion, 
meaning that Russia’s OFDI stock saw an increase rate of over 100-fold, and 
its share in the world OFDI stock grew by more than 10 times between 1995 
and 2014 (Table 1). 
Russia’s outward and inward FDI stock were growing hand in hand. 
This was largely due to ‘the Cyprus capital boomerang’ i. e. the capital 
round tripping from Russia to Cyprus and back to Russia. Here, one 
should note that the value of Russian investments to Cyprus ($ 161 bil-
                                                     
1 Russia ranked the 6th in terms of OFDI flow in 2014, but its global position was 
considerably lower (17th) in terms of accumulated OFDI stock [45]. When one ana-
lyzes the size of the Russian OFDI stock, one needs to remember that outbound in-
vestments from Russia began in 1991, i. e. after the disintegration of the USSR.  
2 In the beginning of 2015, the combined net worth of 86 official billionaires of Rus-
sia was approximately $ 335 billion [21]. To compare, the Russian GDP in 2014 
amounted to $ 1,857 billion [7]. 
3 “FDI is defined as cross-border investment by a resident entity in one economy 
with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another 
economy. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship be-
tween the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by 
the direct investor on the management of the enterprise. Ownership of at least 10 % 
of the voting power, representing the influence by the investor, is the basic criterion 
used. Inward stocks at a given point in time refer to all direct investments by non-
residents in the reporting economy; outward stocks are the investments of the report-
ing economy abroad.” [37] 
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lion) was almost equal to the amount of Cypriot investments in Russia  
($ 194 billion) as of the end of 2013 [6]. 
This implies that several Russian corporations are using Cyprus as their 
bank or safety box. It is impossible to state exactly what the precise 
amount of genuine outward FDI in Russian OFDI stock is. However, if one 
excludes Cyprus and tax havens from the Russian OFDI stock, one may 
conclude that less than a half of the Russian OFDI could be characterized 
as genuine OFDI. 
 
Table 1 
 
The development of Russia’s outward foreign direct investment 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 
Russia's outward FDI stock  
(USD million) 3,015 20,141
120,41
7 
433,65
5 
501,20
2 
431,86
5 
Russia's share in the global 
outward 
FDI stock (%) 0.11 0.25 1.13 2.12 1.90 
 
 
1.67 
Ratio between Russia's  
outward and 
inward FDI stock (%) * 55.17 62.54 90.89 102.48 87.07 
 
114.09 
Cyprus’ share in Russia's out-
ward 
FDI stock (%) 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 42.06 33.67 
no 
data 
availa-
ble 
Cyprus’ share in Russia's  
inward 
FDI stock (%) 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 36.64 34.18 
no  
data 
availa-
ble 
Ratio between Russia's  
accumulated 
investments to and from  
Cyprus (%) 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 
no data
availa-
ble 85.92 83.38 
no da-
ta 
availa-
ble 
 
* Figure exceeding 100 means that Russia’s OFDI stock exceeds the country’s 
inward FDI stock. 
Sources: [6; 45]. 
 
Although the Russian OFDI had been growing fast, the proportion of the 
Russian investments in the inbound FDI stock of the EU remained marginal 
(less than 1 % in 2013 [15]). On the other hand, in some EU member coun-
tries, such as Austria, the Baltic States and Bulgaria, the Russian share ap-
proaches 5 %. Cyprus clearly tops this list with the Russian share exceeding 
10 % (Table 2). 
Russia’s investment stake in the USA, around 0.2 %, is even smaller than 
in the EU [38]. China is no exception, i. e. Russia’s investment in China does 
not exceed one percent of China’s total inbound FDI. 
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Table 2 
 
Russia’s share of inward FDI stock of the EU member states as  
of the end of 2013, unless indicated otherwise 
 
 
Total inward FDI 
stock of host 
country (millions) 
Total Russian FDI stock 
in host country 
(millions) 
Russia’s 
share (%) 
Austria EUR 220,108 EUR 10,436 4.7 
Belgium (2012) EUR 597,984 No host data available – 
Bulgaria EUR 38,157 EUR 1,818 4.8 
Croatia EUR 27,020 EUR 240 0.9 
Cyprus (2012) EUR 15,952 EUR 2,198 13.8 
Czech Republic EUR 103,455 EUR 311 0.3 
Denmark (2012) DKK 788,200 DKK 3,700 0.5 
Estonia EUR 15,882 EUR 843 5.3 
Finland EUR 73,459 EUR 842 1.1 
France EUR 531,800 EUR 600 0.1 
Germany (2012) EUR 792,763 EUR 3,226 0.4 
Greece EUR 20,115 No host data available – 
Hungary (2012) EUR 78,488 EUR 27 0.0 
Ireland EUR 257,513 No host data available – 
Italy EUR 293,000 No host data available – 
Latvia EUR 11,472 EUR 581 5.1 
Lithuania LTL 42,790 LTL 1,611 3.8 
Luxembourg (2011) EUR 81,724 No host data available – 
Malta (2012) EUR 12,356 EUR 13 0.1 
Netherlands EUR 497,677 No host data available – 
Poland (2012) PLN 728,749 PLN 2,092 0.3 
Portugal EUR 93,168 EUR 62 0.1 
Romania (2012) EUR 59,126 EUR 79 0.1 
Slovakia EUR 42,660 No host data available – 
Slovenia EUR 10,729 EUR 49 0.5 
Spain EUR 519,175 EUR 350 0.1 
Sweden (2012) SEK 2 360,000 No host data available – 
UK GBP 936,452 GBP 1,218 0.1 
 
EUR 1 = DKK 7.45; GBP 0.80; LTL 3.45; PLN 4.21; SEK 9.20; USD 1.27 (Eu-
ropean Central Bank 15.10.2014). 
Source: [32, p. 223—224]. 
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Compared to the EU, the USA and China, the importance of the Russian 
OFDI in some CIS countries is gargantuan. Russia covers, for instance, the 
bulk of the Tajik inward FDI stock and some 40—60 % of the Belarusian 
and Uzbek inward FDI stock (fig. 1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Russia’s share in the inward FDI stock of the recipient country  
as of the end of 2013 
 
Note: There are some notable statistical differences concerning Russia’s share in 
the EU member states between this map and Table 2. One can take Cyprus as an ex-
ample. Some discrepancies could also be observed in some former Soviet republics, 
such as Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian statistical authorities, Russia’s share in 
Ukraine’s inward FDI stock was 7.4 % in the end of 2013 [44]. 
Source: [16, p. 26]. 
 
What was the role of the Russian government in transforming Russia 
from an OFDI outsider to the world’s sixth largest capital exporter with an 
FDI outflow amounting to USD56 billion in 2014? How should Western 
governments treat Russian corporations now, when relations between Russia 
and the West are at their coldest since the collapse of the USSR? How will 
the sanctions affect the Russian investment abroad? These and many other 
questions currently puzzle everybody, from researchers to decision-makers 
in business and politics. 
 
2.  Objective and accomplishment of the research 
 
This article aims to pull aside the curtain of mystery shrouding Rus-
sian OFDI and discuss possible motives, which have pushed or attracted 
Russian corporations overseas. In addition, this article analyzes the im-
K. Liuhto 
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pact of the Western sanctions and Russia’s counter-sanctions on the Rus-
sian OFDI. 
I started to follow the Russian OFDI already in the second half of the 
1990s, when the news of foreign acquisitions by Russian corporations be-
came more frequent in the Western media.  For nearly two decades, 
I have been systematically reading all that the Western media and aca-
demics have written about Russian OFDI. More recently, my former col-
league and I analyzed about a hundred scientific studies related to the 
Russian OFDI [32]. 
While all these studies might have formed my perspective on the Russian 
OFDI, I will only refer to some of them in this article. Therefore, a reader 
interested in the topic is advised to get acquainted with the aforementioned 
article, which offers perhaps the most comprehensive literature review of the 
Russian OFDI conducted so far.  
In addition to the systematic monitoring of the written material, during 
the past 20 years I have had a chance to talk with numerous Russian and 
Western politicians, policy-makers, authorities, businessmen and scholars, 
whose views on the Russian OFDI compliment the literature analysis. I do 
not refer to these discussions, since they have been private or even confiden-
tial in nature.   
This article is a ‘travelogue’ of my 20-year journey as a researcher. As 
with any travelogue, it is subjective and somewhat biased, but even with the 
possible deficiencies, this article may expand the prevailing understanding of 
motivations behind the Russian OFDI. I hope that this article encourages re-
searchers to intensify their empirical research on Russian OFDI, since, by 
doing so, they may challenge the common sense conclusions and uncover 
and demolish prevailing myths. 
In order to comprehend the motivations behind the Russian OFDI better, 
I have used the dominating theory in the field as the foundation of this article.  
 
3.  Theoretical framework for a firm’s motivation to invest abroad 
 
The most cited typology of FDI motivations is Dunning’s taxonomy 
[11]. The taxonomy is based on Dunning’s OLI paradigm (1977) that ex-
plains why (Ownership advantage) decides to internationalize, where (Loca-
tion advantage) it is more likely to invest abroad, and how (Internalization 
advantage) a firm decides to become a multinational. Dunning’s taxonomy 
consists of four main motivations: 
(1) Resource seeking: a firm invests abroad to acquire resources that are 
not available at the home market or that are available at a lower cost. As an 
example, one can name land, labor, capital and natural resources.   
(2) Market seeking: a firm invests abroad to find new buyers for its 
goods and services. Occasionally, a firm follows its growing export flows, 
clients or suppliers to foreign markets, i. e. “follow your customers” strategy. 
Sometimes, a physical presence abroad is required to convince a firm’s cur-
rent customers and discourage competitors.  
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(3) Efficiency seeking: a firm invests abroad to “take advantage of differ-
ences in the availability and costs of traditional factor endowments in differ-
ent countries” or it goes abroad to “take advantage of the economies of scale 
and scope and of differences in consumer tastes and supply capabilities” 
[11, p. 60]. 
(4) Strategic asset seeking: a firm invests abroad to acquire a new tech-
nological base rather than merely exploits its existing technology. 
The majority of international business (IB) studies use Dunning’s OLI 
paradigm rather than aims at challenging, modifying or criticizing it. The 
main criticism of the eclectic paradigm in the literature are: 1) its failure to 
account for the role of managers; 2) its inability to handle the dynamic evo-
lution of the multinational companies; 3) an unclear specification of what 
can serve as measures of the major constructs and how these constructs are 
related; and 4) a limitation in dealing with the interaction between the policy 
environment and the firm [9]. 
A year later, Eden [12, p. 277] proposed the expansion of the OLI para-
digm with ‘when’ and ‘what’ questions. She wrote: “When I was in kinder-
garten, my teacher taught me that the way to learn about a new object was to 
ask five basic questions: Who or what, when, where, why and how? I have 
always believed that the OLI (or eclectic) paradigm was about a subset of 
those questions. … My thesis is that OLI should best be seen as a way of 
looking at the phenomenon of multinational enterprises and their activities. 
OLI addresses three of the five kindergarten questions — the why, where 
and how of MNE activities.” 
Following Eden’s idea, one could ask whether the internationalization 
of a firm should be analyzed via three traditional questions: ‘why’ (motiva-
tion), ‘where’ (location), ‘how’ (a mode of internationalization), and two 
new ones: ‘when’ (appropriate timing to internationalize) and ‘who or 
what’ (readiness to internationalize). A firm’s management must consider 
all these questions simultaneously and come to a decision, which it per-
ceives the best. Thus, the decision to internationalize is a compromise, as a 
firm’s management has to answer these questions either consciously or un-
consciously. 
Franco et al. [23] criticized Dunning’s FDI motivation taxonomy as 
overlapping, and therefore they propose a modified motivation-based clas-
sification of FDI. Their classification consists of three parts: 1) resource 
seeking, 2) market seeking and 3) non-marketable asset seeking. The inter-
pretation of Franco et al. concerning resource seeking is close to Dunning’s 
taxonomy, but it differs in one crucial point. Franco and his associates treat 
technological and managerial capabilities not as resources, but as non-mar-
ketable assets. The second classification is very close to Dunning as well, 
but Franco et al. wish to emphasize that foreign market to be exploited is 
not necessarily the market where FDI takes place. In other words, the FDI 
can be either in a direct form or in an indirect one. The third classification 
also resembles Dunning’s taxonomy. However, it stresses the acquisition 
of assets, which are not directly transferable through market transactions. 
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Such assets can only be exploited inside the country or in the local context 
where they are created. Even if Franco et al. notice that Dunning’s taxon-
omy contains overlapping, the authors are not able to produce a clear-cut 
classification on FDI motivations; instead they merely modify Dunning’s 
taxonomy.    
When analyzing Dunning’s contribution to the IB studies, one should not 
forget that Dunning developed his OLI paradigm over time. Researchers 
who use Dunning’s OLI paradigm as a framework for their own endeavors 
may use completely different versions, increasing the confusion [13]. There-
fore, Narula [36], Dunning’s former student, proposes the simplification of 
the OLI paradigm instead of expanding it.  
To sum up the theoretical discussion above: despite possible shortcom-
ings in Dunning’s taxonomy, it dominates the IB literature for a good rea-
son, i. e. it has an extremely high explanatory power, and therefore Dun-
ning’s taxonomy [11] was chosen as the theoretical framework of this arti-
cle as well. 
 
4. Most frequent motivations of Russian firms to invest abroad 
 
Even if the motivations and internationalization strategies of Russian 
firms may vary depending on place, time or industry [25; 47; 22], I have 
tried to summarize 10 most frequent motives of Russian companies to invest 
abroad:  
(1) OFDI as a personal ‘bank’: even if Russia does not enforce re-
strictions on capital exports any longer, it is more convenient for Russian 
corporations to execute their financial operations when they retain part of 
their finance abroad, which they may also use as collateral to get foreign 
loans, i. e. raising capital. A part of the Russian OFDI has been conducted to 
finance their operation in the home market, which explains partially massive 
capital round-tripping4; 
(2) Market entry and expansion: the number of the Russian firms, that 
carry out significant production outside Russia, is surprisingly small com-
pared to the total amount of capital (over $ 400 billion) moved from Russia 
abroad. This implicitly implies that many of Russian units abroad act as sales 
and marketing units. With these units, Russian firms move closer to the final 
consumer, and hence they may avoid the unnecessary use of middlemen 
[48]. Russian banks in particular have followed their existing customers in 
their internationalization process [31];  
(3) Raising profit margins: profit margins are higher at the end of the 
value chain, and therefore several Russian firms have moved along the value 
chain and transformed themselves from an exporter of raw materials into a 
seller of final goods; 
                                                     
4 Bulatov [5] observed this phenomenon, i. e. Russian firms’ motive to keep some of 
their assets outside Russia in order to invest these funds in Russia and elsewhere, 
already in the mid-1990s. 
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(4) Tax planning and minimization of customs fees: Russian companies 
tend to keep their foreign assets in tax havens and low tax countries, which 
helps them in their legal tax planning. Some Russian firms use transfer pric-
ing and other corporate transfers to minimize customs fees and duties. Some-
times, production is moved outside of Russia to avoid the country’s own ex-
port duties, or alternatively import duties of the recipient country; 
(5) Risk aversion: some private Russian firms do not keep all their assets 
in Russia due to the perceived political risk of their home market. Russian 
businessmen have learned the golden rule of international business and re-
frain from keeping all their eggs in one basket; 
(6) Securing a company’s logistical chain: a few Russian firms have ac-
quired logistical units abroad to secure the exports of their commodities from 
the domestic production site to an end consumer abroad, since being too de-
pendent on any service provider in logistics may create unpleasant surprises 
in terms of logistical flows; 
(7) Acquisition of advanced Western technology: a fairly small number 
of Russian knowledge-intensive firms have invested abroad to acquire ad-
vanced foreign technology [for a more detailed discussion on the theme, see 
18; 19; 39; 22];  
(8) Serving Russia’s foreign policy objectives: although there is no ex-
plicit evidence on serving Russia’s foreign policy, it seems highly likely that 
some Russian investment projects in less developed countries in particular 
may have been conducted to support Russian foreign policy objectives rather 
than to execute business goals only5; 
(9) Acquisition of real estate or an establishment of a firm abroad in or-
der to get a “Golden Visa”: empirical research has shown that motives of 
Russian SMEs to invest abroad can go beyond conventional business ration-
ality and one may find rather personal reasons behind investment decisions, 
such as a goal to migrate to a host country, a desire to acquire a long-term 
residence permit abroad or even to get a foreign citizenship [50]. A surpris-
ingly large number of Russian citizens have acquired real estate or estab-
lished a firm in an EU country to receive a long-term residence permit [29; 
43; 24; 26]; 
                                                     
5 For example, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that Russia’s foreign 
policy would have played a certain role in Lukoil’s decision to invest in war-torn 
Iraq in 2009 [34]. Liuhto and Vahtra have tried built a typology explaining the rela-
tionship between the Russian OFDI and Russia’s government policies [33]. Here, 
one needs to stress that the impact of the Russian government on the Russian OFDI 
is not unambiguous [40]. For example, Fortescue and Hanson concluded that politi-
cal motives do not play an important role in the outward expansion of the Russian 
steel companies [22]. It is important to notice that the steel industry is virtually en-
tirely privately owned. In the further studies, it would be necessary to study the rela-
tionship between the internationalization motives of the Russian state-owned corpo-
rations and the Russian foreign policy, since by definition the state-controlled com-
panies implement the objectives of the state and when these companies internation-
alize they become a part of the country’s foreign policy tool box.  
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(10) A necessity driven by increasing global competition: the Russian 
market is less than three percent of the global economy, and hence several 
Russian major companies have noticed that in order to survive in global 
competition, they have to expand abroad, i. e. the constraints of the domestic 
market push a firm to internationalize. 
When one studies motives of Russian capital exports, one should not 
forget Russia’s indirect investments via Cyprus and other countries to their 
final destination [41; 28]. The majority of indirect investment from Russia 
can be explained by the fact that Russian companies keep their assets in tax 
havens and low tax countries and use them to finance their operations either 
in Russia or in other markets. In a relatively small number of cases, howev-
er, the transit countries (front companies) have been used to disguise the 
Russian origin in order to avoid negative reaction from host country gov-
ernments, since some recipient countries have been reluctant to allow Rus-
sian companies to enter industries that they consider strategic for the func-
tioning of their economy. One may take some acquisition processes of some 
European energy companies as an example [35; 42]. 
According to media reports, the use of front companies has sometimes 
been linked with Russia’s foreign intelligence [20; 46]. However, these front 
companies should not be confused with true OFDI, as most of them do not 
meet the definition of FDI and they have not been conducted to carry out 
business abroad. Similarly, money laundering is not linked with legal busi-
ness [54], and therefore its connection with the Russian OFDI is not dealt 
with in this article. On the basis of the available evidence, the author is una-
ble to conclude what the relationship between Russia’s organized crime and 
the Russian OFDI is [52; 2].   
 
5. Research findings through the prism of Dunning’s taxonomy 
 
The amount of Russian OFDI has grown extremely fast; over 100 times 
since the year 1995 and over 20 times since the beginning of the new mil-
lennium. An extremely low starting point in 1995 and the growth of natural 
resource prices in this millennium are perhaps two most fundamental reasons 
behind such a rapid growth in the Russian OFDI. 
Capital round-tripping is closely linked with the Russian OFDI. The fol-
lowing two statistical observations support this conclusion: 1) Russia’s out-
ward FDI stock has been growing hand in hand with the country’s inward 
FDI stock; and 2) a small and less prosperous Cyprus is Russia’s largest 
outward FDI target and the country’s largest inward FDI source. Capital 
round-tripping occurs for various reasons; some Russian firms use it to avoid 
taxes or potential risks on the home market, whereas others utilize it to raise 
less expensive loans from Western financial institutions to  finance own op-
erations at the home market.  
Russia is by far the world’s largest country in terms of territory (almost 
double the size of the USA and approximately four times larger than the EU) 
and it has been blessed with a giant natural resource base. The country also 
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possesses qualified, relatively large and, by Western standards, inexpensive 
labor force. Therefore, it is logical that resource seeking does not dominate 
in the internationalization of Russian firms, though some Russian oil and 
metal companies have acquired oil fields and mines abroad, particularly in 
less developed countries. However, there is one major exception to the rule, 
and that is capital. To put it differently, an access to less expensive finance 
offered by the Western banks is one of the underlying motivations of the 
Russian corporations to open their units abroad and take this money back to 
their country.  
Russian firms produce relatively little overseas, when one takes into ac-
count the total amount of the Russian OFDI (over $ 400 billion). This is not 
a surprise since the vast domestic natural resource base forms the core of 
Russian firms’ global competitiveness. Even if foreign production is a less 
typical occurrence, foreign sales and marketing activities are substantial. 
Therefore, I am inclined to conclude that market seeking (incl. serving better 
the existing clientele and finding new consumers) and efficiency seeking 
(incl. raising profit margins, minimizing transaction costs and securing effi-
cient flow of goods to consumers) dominate in the internationalization of 
Russian firms. Strategic asset seeking has so far remained modest, though 
some Russian knowledge-intensive firms have already purchased some 
Western companies to acquire modern technology, which is not available in 
the market otherwise.   
Russia is the world’s largest energy producer and exporter, and there-
fore it is understandable that the country’s foreign policy may sometimes 
be detected behind some OFDI. In this respect, Russia does not seem to 
differ significantly from major global powers. Risk aversion related to per-
ceived political risks of Russia is a less traditional FDI motive. However, it 
is difficult to assess the impact of risk aversion, since there are no reliable 
empirical studies on the topic. Outward investment linked to obtaining res-
idence permits abroad is another extraordinary motivation for foreign in-
vestment. Although this phenomenon has been growing fast, one should 
not exaggerate its role in Russia’s overall OFDI stock. Furthermore, one 
should keep in mind that Russians do not top the residence permit statistics 
of the EU [17]. 
These three home country factors related to the Russian OFDI suggest 
a modest modification or a slight expansion of Dunning’s taxonomy on 
FDI motivations6. Should one exclude these three peculiar FDI motiva-
tions, one cannot make a major distinction between the motivations of a 
Russian firm to invest abroad and those of the Western counterpart, and 
therefore one may conclude that a Russian outward investor has during the 
past 20 years become rather ordinary in the eyes of a Western IB scholar 
(Table 3). 
                                                     
6 Kalman Kalotay, Economic Affairs Officer at the UNCTAD, has made a funda-
mental discovery related to the applicability on Dunning’s OLI paradigm on the 
Russian OFDI. Kalotay [27, p. 53] concludes: “the eclectic paradigm could be ap-
plied to Russian multinationals with its extension to home-country factors. Other 
theories, however, would require more radical rethinking in future research.” 
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Table 3 
 
Dunning’s taxonomy on FDI motivation and the preliminary  
findings on the Russian OFDI 
 
Taxonomy  
on FDI motivations Findings of the Russian OFDI 
Resource seeking OFDI as a personal bank (1) 
Market seeking Market entry and expansion (2) — a pull factor 
A necessity driven by increasing global competition (10) 
— a push factor 
Efficiency seeking Raising profit margins (3) 
Tax planning and minimization of customs fees (4) 
Securing a company’s logistical chain (6) 
Strategic asset seeking Acquisition of advanced Western technology (7) 
Home-country fac-
tors related to Russia 
Risk aversion (5) 
Serving Russia’s foreign policy objectives (8) 
Acquisition of real estate or an establishment of a firm 
abroad in order to get a “Golden Visa” (9) 
 
6. The impact of the sanctions on the Russian OFDI 
 
Russia’s sanctions do not target the Russian OFDI yet, but in practice 
Russia’s state-owned enterprises in particular have to take into account the 
country’s sanction policy. This does not necessarily mean that the Russian 
government would not allow them to invest abroad, but rather the sanction 
era puts more responsibility on the shoulders of the state-owned companies 
and the country’s largest private corporations to inform more about their for-
eign investment plans to the Russian government. 
Western sanctions, in turn, are targeted at roughly 100 Russian citizens 
and a few dozen firms7. Although the total number of those sanctioned is not 
that great, the restrictions apply to some of Russia’s key personalities, Rus-
sia’s largest oil and gas producers (such as Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom and 
Novatek), and some major banks (such as Sberbank, Gazprombank and 
Vneshekonombank), so their direct impact is notable. The indirect impact of 
the sanctions, such as a deteriorating ruble exchange rate and increasing in-
terest rates, could be even more significant than the direct one, since the 
sanctions weaken all Russian firms’ capability to invest abroad. Moreover, 
the political and economic business environment of the EU and the USA 
                                                     
7 The Western sanctions have been gradually introduced since 17th of March 2014, 
i. e. one day after the Crimean referendum. The Western sanctions towards Russia 
are not a uniform set of restrictions, since the EU, the USA and some other countries 
have introduced their own sanctions and the sanctions are not targeted exactly to the 
same individuals and firms. A few days after the first round of the Western sanc-
tions, Russia started to introduce its counter-sanctions. So far, Russia has banned an 
entry of some 100 European and US citizens into Russia and stopped the imports of 
some agricultural produce and foodstuffs from the countries, which have imposed 
their sanctions on Russia.  
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may distract Russian corporations from the Western markets. As a fresh ex-
ample, one may take Gazprom, one of Russia’s largest outward investors 
[30]. Gazprom Germania announced at the end of July 2015 that the compa-
ny might start to restructure its foreign assets due to "changes in economic 
and political conditions" [49]. 
Even with Gazprom threatening to diminish its presence in the Western 
market, there is evidence that some other state-run companies are still eager 
to invest in the West. For example, Arctech Helsinki Shipyard became at the 
end of 2014 fully-owned by Russian United Shipbuilding Corporation [1] 
and Rosatom was at the time of writing this article willing to become a ma-
jor owner in a new Finnish nuclear power plant with a 34 %-share [53]. 
To conclude, the picture on the Russian OFDI is not painted with dark 
colors only. However, one should not forget that Russia’s export has 
dropped by approximately 30 % in January-May 2015 [8]. As the FDI out-
flows tend to follow the export flows, the future of the Russian OFDI in the 
West is shadowed with certain uncertainty. 
As the companies and their cross-border investment build bridges among 
the nations, one should keep supporting non-political investments despite the 
political ice age between Russian and the West. As small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are non-political actors, the European Commission and 
the Russian Government should, despite the prevailing sanctions, do their 
best to keep the business environment receptive to inward investments and 
support the internationalization of their SMEs. 
Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave surrounded by the EU, could become a 
common pilot zone for the EU-Russia SME cooperation, i. e. the EU and the 
Russian Federation could design a joint program to promote the internation-
alization of the SMEs. Common acts of goodwill are required to stop the vi-
cious circle of the sanctions. We have to understand that the contemporary 
path leads to a dead-end in the literal sense of the word. Our leaders should 
act quickly in search for a commonly accepted political resolution to the 
Ukrainian crisis, since the sand in our hourglass runs faster than many would 
have imagined.     
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